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Comments
DUMPOR'S CASE IN MISSOURI
In Garland v. Lisetta Investment Co.,' the St. Louis Court of Appeals re-
fused to give effect to a condition against further assignment which was at least
fairly implied in the terms of the original lease. The plaintiffs, who sought a
declaratory judgment in regard to their right to assign their interest, were assignees
of the original lessee. The lease set forth that the lessee could assign his interest
freely, further that all provisions were to inure to the benefit of the parties. The
defendant landlord sought for a construction of the lease that would limit the
term parties to himself and the original lessee, therefore by implication for-
1. 234 S.W. 2d 347 (Mo. App. 1950).
(34)
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bidding assignment by any subsequent assignee. The plaintiff had attempted to
assign his interest, but the prospective assignees insisted that the lessor defendant's
permission be obtained. The defendant had refused. While the court recognized
"the undoubted right by the stipulation in a lease to restrict the right of assign-
ment or forbid subletting of the premises," - the view was taken that such cove-
nants are not favored by the courts, and will be construed strictly against the
lessor. Thus the court refused to infer from the stipulation that "all provisions
are to inure to the benefit of the parties" that further assignments by assignees were
forbidden and ruled that permission from the lessor was not necessary to enable
plaintiff to assign.
Whether in asserting that such covenants were not favored by the courts
and should be strictly construed, the court was influenced by the "Rule in Dumpor's
Case" or by the general policy of the courts to strictly construe conditions and
convenants, would be difficult to ascertain. It is, however, at least arguable that
the court was swayed to some extent by the rule pronounced by Lord Coke. In
the case from which the doctrine draws its name,3 the lease contained a proviso
that the lessee or his assignee should not alien the premises without the special
license of the lessor. Afterwards the lessor licensed the lessee to alien or demise the
land, or any part of it, to any persons or person. Afterwards the assignee assigned
the premises to another, the lessor re-entered to terminate, and an action of
trespass was brought by the then assignee. It was held that the alienation by license
had determined the condition, "so that no alienation which he might afterwards
make could break the proviso or give cause of entry to the lessors, for the lessors
could not dispense with an alienation for one time and that the same estate
should remain subject to the proviso after."4 Thus the case is generally regarded
as standing for the rule that, where a lease contains a condition subsequent against
assignment without the lessor's license, a single license to assign operates to
extinguish the condition as to all future assignments.5
The case is still law in many American jurisdictions, 6 but the judicial tendency
seems to be to limit, rather than extend the rule.7
2. Id. at 348.
3. Dumpor's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603).
4. 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 1113 (1603).
5. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 172 (1936).
6. German-American Say. Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932, 24
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1066 (1909); Aste v. Putman's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 147, 141 N.E.
666, 31 A.L.R. 149 (1923); Lynch v. Joseph 228 App. Div. 367, 240 N.Y. Supp.
176 (4th Dep't 1930); Lowry v. Atlantic Coal Co., 272 Pa. 19, 115 AtI. 847 (1922);
Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922).
In Reid v. Weissner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 Adt. 877 (1898), the rule was
held to apply although the lease was assigned with all covenants, terms and con-
ditions.
7. Mulligan v. Hollingsworth, 99 Fed. 216 (W.D. Mo. 1900); Jones v.
Durrer, 96 Cal. 95, 30 Pac. 1027 (1892); Robbins v. Conway, 92 Ill. App. 173
(1900); Crocker v. Old South Society in Boston, 106 Mass. 489 (1871); Douglas
v. Herms, 53 Minn. 204, 54 N.W. 1112 (1893); Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N.H. 149
(1850); Conger v. Duryee, 90 N.Y. 594 (1882); Granite Building Assn. v. Greene,
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It is not at all clear from the decisions whether the rule is law in Missouri.8
Very early, however, in Tennessee Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. Scott, the
Missouri court indicated that the "Rule in Dumpor's Case" if law, would be con-
fined to assignments where there was a landlord-tenant relationship and would not
be extended to other legal relationships involving assignment. The case involved
assignment of a fire insurance policy. Dictum in this early case also indicated
that the "Rule in Dumpor's Case" was considered to be law in Missouri even
though subject to limitations. The court said in part: "This doctrine in relation
to covenants in leases originated in Dumper's Case and although much criticized
by eminent judges, is still adhered to as the law."10 This dictum seemed to be
confirmed in Dougherty v. Matthews."' In this case the plaintiff landlord gave
permission to the tenant to assign his term to the defendant. The defendant
later sought to assign and plaintiff gave his permission with stipulation that in
return defendant would stand good for the rent. Plaintiff then sued for six month's
rent based on said agreement and recovery was denied on the ground that there
was no consideration for the promise of the defendant to pay rent. The court
reasoned that since defendant had this -right to assign anyway, without benefit
of the permission given by plaintiff, his promise was therefore without considera-
tion and void. Without discussing the "Rule in Dumpor's Case," the court seemed
to assume that the restriction against assignment would not apply to an assignee
of the leasehold. However, in Harmon v. DickersonA2 the Springfield Court of
Appeals held that where a sublease provided that the sublessee could not sublet
or allow any other tenant to come in with or under him without the written con-
sent of the original lessor, such restriction was not exhausted by an assignment
by the sublessee, and after the transfer by him the provision yet remained as a
prohibition against subletting by the assignee without the consent of the lessor.
The court discussed cases which generally followed the "Rule in Dumpor's Case,"
but pointed to certain distinctions which were present in the principal case. There
had been a series of assignments of the sublease, but each had contained the
restrictive provision. With the exception of the assignment to the plaintiff, the
assignor in each instance had secured the written permission of the lessor. The
defendant, however, in making the last assignment had not obtained the per-
mission of the lessor. The lessor had asserted his power to terminate the lease,
the plaintiff had given up the premises on demand and immediately sued defendant,
apparently on a theory of restitution, alleging the defendant's fraudulent representa-
tion of authority to assign the sublease. The court placed main emphasis in its
decision on the fact that defendant's theory of defense amounted to an admission
that he did not have authority to assign, and that he would not therefore be
allowed to change this theory on appeal. Although not noted in the opinion of
8. See Hudson, Conditions Subsequent in Conveyances in Missouri, 5 U. OF
Mo. BUL. L. SEa. 3, 25 (1914); GILL, MISSOURI TITLES § 547 (3d ed. 1931)J
9. 14 Mo. 46 (1851).
10. 14 Mo. 46, 47 (1851).
11. 35 Mo. .20 (1865).
12. 184 S.W. 139 (Mo. App. 1916).
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the court, it might also have been pointed out that since the restriction was
contained in each assignment of the sublease with the exception of the assignment
to the plaintiff, the condition could not be said to be extinguished, and the
defendant did not therefore have the power or right to assign.
In Dean v. Lee,13 the court indicated by way of dictum that Dumpor's Case
in 1603 was only evidence of the common law prior to 160714 and that the court
was not bound by this decision but had to determine what the common law was.
The fact situation presented by the case only indirectly reflected a problem similar
to that found in Dumpor's Case. The lease provided that assignment could only be
made by a lessee to a responsible person and through an instrument making the
assignee responsible for the covenants of the lease; that if such were made the
lessee would no longer be responsible for the covenants under the lease. Numerous
assignments were made of the lease, none of them in accordance with the afore-
mentioned provision. The defendant, last in the series of assignees, attempted to
assign the lease, notifying the lessor plaintiff of his action. Plaintiff immediately
denied defendant's right to assign and demanded the current rent which was
refused and for which action was brought. The court construed the provisions as
prohibiting assignment, but concluded that the covenant did not run with the
land. Therefore, since defendant's liability was based on privity of estate rather
than contract, he had divested himself of any possible liability under the lease
when he assigned the same. Again while the court stressed that it did not have
to follow "The Rule in Dumpor's Case," and while the decision was based on
the "covenant running with the land" distinction, the rule laid down by Lord
Coke was adhered to. While not stressed by the court, it will be noted even though
defendant divested himself of liability by reason of the assignment, his power
to assign might well be explained by pointing to the extinguishment of the cove-
nant against assignment.
It thus appears clear that there is sufficient life to be found in this old rule
in Missouri that draftsmen of leases will do well to take precautions against its
possible application. In Lindsley v. Scthnaider Brewing Co.,15 the rule was success-
fully avoided by way of a memorandum on the back of the lease. In essence
the memorandum set forth that the lessor consented to the assignment subject to
all covenants, and that the assignee accepted the transfer with all its responsibilities.
The lease itself contained a covenant against assignment on penalty of forfeiture.
This memorandum was signed by the lessor and the assignee. Shortly thereafter
the defendant assignee made an attempted assignment, the plaintiff landlord
refused to recognize the purported subsequent assignee, demanded rent from the
13. 227 Mo. App. 206, 52 S.W. 2d 426 (1932).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010. (1949): "The common law of England and all
statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of
James the First, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom,
which common law and statutes are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the
Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute
laws in force for the time being, shall be the rule of action and decision in this state.
15. 59 Mo. App. 271 (1894).
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defendant, brought suit. The court found consideration for the promise of the
defendant because of the restrictive covenant and allowed recovery. Emphasis was
placed by the court on the privity of contract which was created rather than
mere privity of estate, but again the court could have found liability on the
ground that the restrictive condition had been effectively preserved, and not extin-
guished by the first license given by the landlord.
As a practical matter, therefore, in order to avoid the dangers of possible appli-
cation of the "Rule in Dumpor's Case," it is important that lessors in Missouri
should insure that assignees of leaseholds are subject to all of the restrictive cove-
nants of the original lease. As suggested in the foregoing case this can be accomp-
lished very simply by way of a signed memorandum.
DONALD HoY
MATERIAL WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: SECURING AND
AsSURING THEIR ATTENDANCE
The inability of the prosecution to produce a material witness at a preliminary
hearing, grand jury proceeding, or trial of a person suspected of or charged with
the violation of some criminal law may forever free the suspect or defendant and
deny to the state a genuine opportunity of determining his guilt or innocence.
Hence it becomes important to have effective and expedient means of producing
a witness or at least, in a proper case, of producing the witness' testimony in criminal
proceedings. There has been some recent criticisms of the procedure available in
Missouri. Henry J. Fox, Jr. prosecuting attorney of Jackson County, has said:
"The present material witness law in effect in this state is of little or no value.
Witnesses are permitted under the existing laws to sign their own bonds. They can
go forth to any other state in the Union and remain safe from extradition."', Mr.
Roscoe Van Valkenburgh, President of the Kansas City Bar Association, expressed
a similar opinion, saying: ". . . Now there is one other thing that makes it very
difficult for the guilty to be convicted, and that is that we should have a more
stringent material witness law in this state. ... "-
Is this criticism justified? Is Missouri lagging in the effective administration
of its criminal laws because of inadequate material witness laws? It is the purpose
of the writer to examine the provisions available in Missouri, to compare these
with the laws of some other jurisdictions, and to offer for consideration possible
remedies for such defects as may exist.3
There are two general aspects to the material witness problem. One aspect
of the problem is to secure a witness from within the state, while the second aspect
is to secure a witness from without the state. Each aspect may in turn be sub-
divided into two situations (1) to secure the initial appearance of a witness
1. Transcript of Proceeding, Sub-Committee on Crime of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 66th General Assembly, p. .70 (May 10, 1951).
2. Id. at 524.
3. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the problems of compel-
ling the witness to testify once he is before the proper tribunal.
[Vol. 18
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before the magistrate, the grand jury or the trial court; (2) to assure the sub-
sequent availability and attendance of the witness at the trial after he has testified
at the preliminary hearing or before the grand jury.
I. WITNESSES WITHIN THE STATE
A. Securing the Initial Appearance of a Witness
A material witness may be defined as one who is necessary to prove, or at
least substantially aid, the state's case. In Missouri the provisions of the law in civil
cases relevant to witnesses extend subtantially to criminal cases.4 In order to
secure the attendance of a state's witness, Missouri, as most other jurisdictions,
provides for the issuance of a subpoena. A subpoena is ". . . a writ or order
directed to a person, and requiring his attendance at a particular time and place
to testify as a witness." 5 Section 544.060r provides that "At the time of issuing
a warrant, the clerk shall issue subpoenas for the witnesses on behalf of the state,
but such subpoenas for the witnesses on behalf of the state, shall not be served
until the defendant is arrested or in custody.1'' Section 545.320 contains further
conditions before the subpoena can be issued.8 Section 540.160 provides: "Whenever
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.360 (1949) provides: "The provisions of law
in a civil case, relative to compelling the attendance and testimony of witnesses,
their examination, the administration of oaths and affirmations and proceedings
for contempt, to enforce the remedies and protect the rights of parties, shall ex-
tend to criminal cases so far as they are in their nature applicable thereto,
subject to the provisions contained in any statute." See also Rule 26.03, RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE COURTS OF MISSOURI (Published April 14,
1952 and effective Jan. 1, 1953).
5. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933).
6. Hereinafter sections of the Missouri statutes cited shall refer to the
M6. REV. STATS. (1949); Rules cited, unless otherwise indicated, shall refer to the
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE COURTS OF MISSOURI, promulgated
April, 1952 in accordance with Article V, Section 5, of the 1945 Missouri Con-
stitution, which provides: "The supreme court may establish rules of practice
and procedure for all courts. The rules shall not change substantive rights, or
the law relating to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right
of trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The court shall publish the rules and
fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall take effect before six
months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or amended by a law
limited to the purpose."
7. For statutes of other jurisdictions see: FLA. STAT. § 90.11 (1941);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 781.1 (1946); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 703 (1937) ALA. CODE
§ 289 (1940), a more restrictive type statute, provides: "No subpoena must
be issued in a criminal case, unless the defendant is in the custody, or has given
bail to answer the charges."
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.320 (1949) provides: "No subpoena for a
witness .. . shall be issued on the part of the state, unless the name of such
witness be endorsed on the indictment or information, or the prosecuting attorney
shall order the same to be issued, in writing, or the prosecutor shall file an
affidavit that other witnesses ordered by him are positively necessary for a
complete adjudication of the case; and no subpoena shall issue for a witness unless
the defendant is in custody or on bail, or the clerk or magistrate shall have
good reason to believe that he will be apprehended. Subpoenas may be issued to
different counties at the same time, but all witnesses ordered at one time, and
living in the same county shall be included in one subpoena." See Rule 23.08.
1953] COMMENTS
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thereto required by any grand jury, or the foreman thereof, or by the prosecuting
attorney, the clerk of the court in which such jury is impaneled shall issue subpoenas
and other process to bring witnesses to testify before such grand jury; . . ." Section
491.310 provides that "the "magistrate shall issue subpoenas for witnesses at the
instance of either party, and shall include all the witnesses ordered at the same time
by a party in one subpoena." Section 491.320 provides that "A subpoena issued
by a magistrate shall be valid to compel the attendance in a magistrate's court
of a witness as provided in sections 491.010 to 491.270."--these sections dealing
with witnesses generally. Where witnesses are required to attend the trial, Section
491.090 provides that the clerk of the court or a notary public of the county in
which the trial is to take place shall issue a summons "stating the day and place
when and where the witnesses are to appear." Hence the various sections above
provide for compelling the attendance of a witness at a trial of the defendant,
at the grand jury proceedings, and at any preliminary hearing in a magistrate's
court. No problem is encountered therefore, unless the person to whom a subpoena
is directed refuses to comply with the order.
Section 491.150 provides that in such a case, the person refusing to obey the
summons "may be compelled by writ of attachment against his body, to appear,
which may be served in any county in the state, and the sheriff may serve such
writ of attachment . .. in any county adjoining that in which the court is being
held." Further, Section 491.160 provides that "where a cause shall be continued
on account of the absence" of a material witness a writ of attachment may be
issued by the court upon affidavit by a party that a witness is essential to his
cause.9 The writ authorizes the sheriff, or other proper officer, "to take the body
of such witness, that he appear and testify in the cause at the next term thereafter."
Section 540.180 provides that "If any witness, duly summoned to appear and
testify before a grand jury, shall fail or refuse to obey, the court shall cause
compulsory process to be issued to enforce his attendance, and may punish the
delinquent in the same manner and upon like proceedings as provided by law for
disobedience of a subpoena issued out of such court in other cases." Section 491.330
gives the magistrate power to issue an attachment to compel the attendance of
a witness, where the party makes oath that a subpoened witness is essential to the
party's cause. Section 491.340 further provides that every attachment under
Section 491.330 "shall be executed in the same manner as a warrant in a criminal
case. . . ." Thus in effect it would seem that the sheriff, or other authorized officer,
if he can locate the contumacious witness, can insure his attendance by taking
him into custody under the above section.
9. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.160 (1949) in full reads: "When a cause shall
be continued on account of the absence of a witness, duly summoned, and the
party for whom such witness shall have been summoned shall make affidavit that
such absent witness is material, and that he cannot safely go to trial without
his testimony, the court may award a writ of attachment, directed to the sheriff
or other proper officer of the proper county, commanding him to take the body
of such witness, that he appear and testify in the cause at the next term there-
after; and the clerk shall issue such writ accordingly, stating therein the day
on which the cause is set for trial, as the day of his appearance." 7
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However, Section 491.170 provides that the attached witness is to be released
by the sheriff upon the witness' entering into a recognizance "in the sum of one
hundred dollars, which the officer securing the writ is authorized to take, condi-
tioned for the appearance and due attendance of such witness.. . ." Section 491.170
would apply only to those witnesses attached under Section 491.160 (where a
cause is continued on account of the absence of a witness) since the language of
Section 491.170 expressly states that it is to apply to a witness attached by a writ
"authorized by section 491.160." Similar provisions can be found in other jurisdic-
tions. Nebraska, for instance, expressly provides that if the attachment "be not
for immediately taking into custody," the witness may give undertaking.' 0 Okla-
homa has a similar provision."' In addition Oklahoma and Nebraska (these states
used merely as examples) give more discretion in fixing the amount of the recogni-
zance. Missouri, on the other hand, fixes a definite sum. Professor Orfield says that
"In some states the statutes limit the amount at which the recognizance can be
kept to a figure so low as to make it ineffective where there is a powerful inducement
to refrain from testifying."' 2 Although in some cases one hundred dollars may be
a sufficient amount, it seems that more discretion should be given to the magistrate
or to the sheriff, especially in criminal cases where the witness has already indicated
his unwillingness to comply with the subpoena.' 3
No provision or case has been found which sets out what is or may be done
if the immediate attendance of a witness is desired when such witness has not been
previously subpoened. As a practical matter such a situation probably would rarely
arise. In most cases, sufficient time could be allowed so that the regular procedure
as outlined by the above sections could be used.
B. Assuring the Subsequent Attendance of a Material Witness
When a witness has appeared at a preliminary hearing or before a grand jury,
how is his presence to be assured at the subsequent trial? It is probably with this
aspect, and the Missouri provisions pertaining thereto that the most dissatisfaction
exists. The pertinent Missouri provision is Section 544.420, which states that
(after a preliminary hearing]:
"If it appears that a felony has been committed, and that there is probable
cause to believe the prisoner guilty thereof, the magistrate shall bind, by
recognizance, the prosecutory, and all material witnesses against such
prisoner, to appear and testify before the court having cognizance of the
offense on such day as the prosecuting attorney shall designate in writing
duly filed with the magistrate at the time, and not to depart such court
without leave."
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1230 (1943).
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN § 393 (1937) ("If the attachment be not for the
immediate bringing the witness ... a sum may be fixed.. .").
12. ORFIELD, CRimINAL PaocE nu FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, pp. 128-129
(1941). Missouri is not cited as an example by Orfield, but is among the more
recent states. See note 13, infra.
13. For a discussion of some of the problems of the administration of the
laws relating to bonds and recognizance see Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 293 (1931).
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Rule 23.08 of the new Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure substantially
incorporates this section. No provision can be found in the statutes or in the
rules for binding any witness who has appeared before the grand jury. Sections
545.070 and 545.320 provide that the names of the state's witnesses should be en-
dorsed upon the indictment or information in order for a subpoena to issue. A
continuance will not be granted if a witness whose name is not endorsed is not
present unless upon affidavit of the prosecuting attorney showing good cause.
Section 544.420 used the word "recognizance," while other sections dealing
with binding prisoners and witnesses use the word "bond."' 1 There is a technical
distinction between a recognizance and a bond, although the statutes do not
alvays seem to recognize it. In State v. Wilson,'5 it was stated:
"While in the main like rules of law are applicable to both of these classes
of obligations the primary distinction must be observed that a recognizance
is, in all cases, a contract acknowledged by the parties and entered or
filed in the records of the court, while a bail bond is an obligation given by
the accused with one or more sureties, conditioned that the same may be
void upon performance by the accused of such acts as he may thereon be
required to perform ... "
Rule 23.08 recognizes this distinction and now provides that "... the magis-
trate may bind any or all material witnesses by bail bonds, . . .", thus avoiding
the use of "recognizances." Rule 23.10 provides that the accused in a proper case
"shall be admitted to bail upon a bond with sufficient security as provided in
these Rules." Rules 32.01 through 32.18 then set forth the various requirements
for sureties and the conditions of the bail bond. Rule 23.08 does not add the words
"with sufficient security," and whether this is significant or not is speculative.
Rule 32.04 states in part: "A person required or permitted to give bail shall
execute a bond for his appearance. One or more sureties may be required; . . .and
in proper cases no security may be required of a witness who has been required to
give bail for his appearance." It may be argued that the net effect of the rules is
to leave it to the discretion of the magistrate as to when, and how much, security
is to be required on a bail bond of a witness, as well as the amount of the bond,
while as to the accused the magistrate must require security. Mr. Henry Fox, Jr.
has recommended that "a material witness in a felony case be placed under bonds
of the same type required of the defendants."' 0 It may be that this has been
accomplished by the new rules.'7
14. In the proposed Rides of Criminal Procedure for Courts of Missouri
(March 28, 1951) at page 30, the committee recommends that there be only
one form of obligation, namely a bond as defined in State v. Wilson (see note 15,
infra).
15. 265 Mo. 1, 175 S.W. 603 (1915).
16. See note 1, supra.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 544.450 (1940) provides that if the offense charged
is a bailable one, the magistrate who issued the warrant shall, at the request of
the person arrested, take from him a recognizance in such sum as may seem
to be sufficient and proper, with sufficient sureties for his appearance at the next
term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense. Rule 23.10 provides: "If
the offense for which the accused is bound over is available and the accused
[Vol. 18
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In a survey of the statutes of fifteen states,' 8 only Illinois has no provision for
the taking of an additional security from the material witness in a proper case.
The Illinois statute expressly provides that a witness shall be required to give
other security for his appearance than his own recognizance.' 9
Although the statutes of the other jurisdictions generally provide that addi-
tional security may be required, there is some differences as to when the additional
security is to be given. Pennsylvania requires a "positive oath" which is to set
forth "sufficient reasons or facts to induce the firm belief on the part of the judge
• . . that any witness will abscond" before requiring bail. 20 Iowa provides that
the witness is to provide an undertaking with surety when the magistrate is satis-
fied by "oath or otherwise" that there is reason to believe that the witness will not
appear.2 ' Florida requires that the magistrate have reasonable grounds that the
witness will not appear,22 while Louisiana insists that it shall appear from the
district attorney's affidavit that the witness will not be within the jurisdiction.23
What effect does the unlimited requirement of the additional security have in
compelling the attendance of the witness? The value of requiring a surety un-
doubtedly lies in the fact that the surety, having a monetary interest in seeing
that the witness complies with the conditions of the bond, will use his efforts to
see that the witness appears at the proper time and place. This would greatly
aid the prosecuting attorney who hopes to assure the attendance of the witness.
However, the witness has problems too. For example, John Q. Witness happens
to see a shooting, and is able to identify the assailant, against whom the charge
is first degree murder. John Q., a laborer owning no real property, supports a wife
and three children. At the preliminary hearing he is determined to be a material
witness, but he is unable to provide security or obtain a surety, the amount of
his bail bond being set at $5,000. What is to be done to or for John Q. Witness?
Section 544.440 now provides:
"If any witness so required to enter into a recognizance refuses to comply
with such order the magistrate may commit him or her to prison until
he or she comply with such order or be otherwise discharged according
to law."
Rule 23.09 repeats Section 544.440, but substitutes "bond" for recognizance," and
adds an additional clause, the significance of which will be discussed below. The
statute by using the word "may" seems to give discretion to the magistrate as to
whether or not to commit the witness. The magistrate, in exercising his discretion,
has not previously been admitted to bail, he shall be admitted to bail upon a
bond with sufficient security as provided in these Rules. Otherwise, he shall be
committed to the county jail of the county, or other place, to be held until dis-
charged by due course of law. ... "
18. California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington.
19. ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38, § 685 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19, § 651 (Purdon 1949).
21, IowA CODE ANN. §761.22 (1946).
22. FLA. STAT. § 902.16 (1941).
23. LA. REv. STAT. § 15-157 (1950).
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could apparently commit John Q. Witness to prison until his testimony is required
at the trial. Rule 32.04 states that cash or negotiable bonds of the United States,
the State of Missouri, or any political subdivisions of Missouri may be accepted as
security. If John Q. has none of these, he would be in a very unfavorable position;
his job would be jeopardized; his family would become a burden upon the state;
and the state would have the additional expense of maintaining the witness. 24
Finally, the guilty defendant may be free on bail while the innocent witness
languishes in jail. Perhaps such a situation was contemplated when the provision
for not requiring any security from the witness in a proper case was included in
Rule 32.04.
This anomalous situation was recognized and discussed before the Missouri
Senate Criminal Law Revision Committee.21 The committee sent out a questionnaire
regarding this and other problems. It sought comment on the following proposal:
"(a) Require bond of material witness, with a ninety day limit on time a witness
may be held in jail if he cannot furnish bond." 26 It has been suggested that such
a time limit would have the beneficial effect of quickly disposing of cases. This
may be true in some instances. However, it is likely that a zealous defense attorney
on a crowded docket often could successfully avoid trial within the ninety
days by using various lawful means, such as requesting a change of venue."- Thus
the time limit may be ineffectual, and at the end of the period the witness will
have gone home, having actually wasted his time and the state's.
Section 544.420 and Rule 23.08 allow a recognizance or bond of the witness
where "it appears to believe the prisoner guilty thereof." This is a reasonable
condition precedent to the requirement of a recognizance, or bail bond. California
provides that an undertaking may be taken "on holding the defendant to answer
or on a plea of guilty where permitted by law. . .".112s Washington requires that the
defendant be arrested or committed to jail before the witness may be compelled to
attend the preliminary hearing,29 while Florida conditions the requiring of a
recognizance on the holding of the defendant to answer the charges of kidnapping,
murder, rape, robbery, and arson.30 As pointed out above, some states require a
further showing of necessity before additional security may be required.1
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:187-21 (1939) states that all persons detained as
witnesses shall be comfortable lodged and provided for, and not further re-
strained in their liberty than is necessary for their detention.
25. The committee was a Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, The
Missouri Senate, 66th General Assembly. See the Transcript of Hearings, May 10,
1952, pp. 570-571.
26. Annex I, Questionnaire, To the Report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee, The Missouri Senate, question 23(a). The tabulated answers are:
Judges: 9 for, 5 against; Bar Associations and Schools: 3 for, 5 against; Prosecut-
ing Attorneys: 28 for, 13 against
27. This was substantially the opinion of Mr. Temple H. Morgett, Magistrate,
Boone County, in a personal interview, March 28, 1952.
28. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 878 (Deering 1949).
29. WAsH. Ray. STAT. §§ 1959, 1960 (Remington 1931).
30. FLA. STAT. § 902.15 (1941).
31. See notes 20 through 23 inclusive, supra. 11
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A serious problem thus exists concerning material witnesses. To a certain extent
the problem is a conflict between the relative interest of the individual and the
interest of the state in the effective administration of its criminal laws. The course
to be taken, therefore, depends upon the interest which is to be stressed. The
prosecuting attorney, who desires to solve all the criminal cases, would want the
strongest possible provisions for binding the witness; the ardent defender of per-
sonal rights would rather have some criminals go free than have one man's
"liberty" restricted merely because he happened to be a witness; the indifferent
citizen would care little of how a witness could be made to attend, unless he
happened to be the witness.
In Article I, Section 18 (b) of the 1945 Missouri Constitution, the following
provision is found:
"Upon a hearing and finding by the Circuit Court in any case wherein
the accused is charged with a felony, that it is necessary to take the
deposition of any witness within the state, other than the defendant and
spouse, in order to preserve the testimony, and on condition that the
court make such orders as will fully protect the rights of personal confron-
tation and cross-examination of the witness by the defendant, the state
may take the deposition of such witness and either party may use the
same at the trial, as in civil cases, provided there has been substantial
compliance with such orders.
"The reasonable personal and travelling expenses of defendant and his
counsel shall be paid by the state or county as provided by law."
Rule 25.13 substantially repeats Article I, Section 18 (b); another sentence is
added to the effect that whenever possible the deposition should be taken in the
same county where the case is pending, and that in such cases the officer before
whom the deposition is to be taken shall have the authority to issue subpoenas
for the witness. No cases have been found interpreting Section 18(b), supra,
nor is it certain whether the section has ever been used in practice. The significance
of Rule 25.13 may come to light when read with Rule 23.09, which states:
"If any witness required to enter into such bond refuses to comply with
such order, the magistrate may commit such person until compliance there-
with or until otherwise discharged according to law, unless his deposition
be taken for use at the trial as provided by law." (Italics supplied.)
Rule 25.12 further outlines in detail when depositions "obtained in accordance with
these Rules" may be used, including occasions "when the party offering the
depositions, after due diligence, have been unable to procure the attendance of
the witness by subpoena." Thus, Missouri may now have available a fair solution
to the problem so that, in a proper case, it may protect the witness who is unable
to furnish bail bond, and at the same time insure the testimony of the witness,
who once testified but who may be unavailable at the time of the trial.
An attempt at a favorable solution has been made in other jurisdictions, an
attempt to balance the interests. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, although
allowing the detention of a witness who fails to give the required bail, provides
that if the witness has been detained for an unreasonable length of time, he may
1953] COMMENTS
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be released; furthermore, the requirement for bail may be modified at any time.i2
At least three states, Louisiana, Florida, and Washington recognize the interest
of the witness as an individual, but at the same time, realizing the necessity of
having his testimony, have provided for depositions in certain cases. These pro-
visions are in effect similar to the Missouri procedure outlined above, although
the Louisiana33 and Florida 34 provisions go into more detail than the Missouri
rules on how the depositions should be obtained. The Florida provision is of
somewhat less value since the defendant must consent before the deposition may be
used in evidence at the trial. The Washington statute, 3  however, is similar to
the Louisiana provision in that the deposition may be introduced at the trial ir-
respective of the defendant's consent, providing the witness is unavailable at the
time of the trial. Professor Orfield has referred to the American Law Institute's
provisionic as a "fair solution" to the problem.37 These provisions prevent the
32. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 18 U.S.C.A., Rule 46(b)
(1951).
33. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 15-158, 15-159 (1950).
34. FLA. STAT. § 902.17 (2) (3) (4) (1951) provided in part: "... (2)
If the magistrate requires the witness to give security for his appearance, and
the witness is unable to give such security, he may move the court having
ultimate jurisdiction to try the defendant, for a reduction of said security. (3)
When it satisfactorily appears by examination on oath of the witness, or any
other person, that the witness is unable to give security, the magistrate in the
first instance, and the trial court having jurisdiction in the second instance shall
make an order finding such fact, and the witness shall be detained pending appli-
cation for his conditional examination. Within three days from the entry of the
order last mentioned, the witness so detained shall be conditionally examined on
behalf of the state or the defendant afid answer in the presence of the other party
and counsel, and shall be taken down by a court reporter or stenographer selected
by the parties and reduced to writing. At the completion of the examination, the
witness shall be discharged, and his deposition may be introduced in evidence by
the defendant at the forthcoming trial, or if the prosecuting attorney and the
defendant and his counsel agree, the deposition may be admitted in evidence at
the trial by stipulation. No such deposition shall be admitted on behalf of the
state, unless the defendant consents thereto. (4) If no conditional examination is
had within the above mentioned period of three days, the witness so detained shall
be forthwith discharged ... "
35. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1962 (Remington 1932).
36. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE § 58(March, 1931): "(1).If a witness required to enter into an undertaking to appear
to testify either with or without security refuses compliance with the order for
that purpose, the magistrate shall commit him to custody until he complies or is
legally discharged. (2) When, however, it satisfactorily appears by examination
on oath of the witness or any other person that the witness is unable to give
further security as provided in section 57 [which provides that where the defendant
is imprisoned or is committed to bail, the magistrate may require each material
witness for the defendant or state to enter into a written undertaking to appear
and to testify at the trial or else forfeit such sum as the magistrate may fix], the
magistrate shall make an order finding such fact and the witness shall be detained
pending application for his conditional examination. Within three days from the
entry of 'the order last memtioned, the witness so detained may be conditionally
examined on behalf of the State or the defendant on application made for that
purpose. Such examination shall be by question and answer in the presence of
the other party, or when a witness for the State is being examined, after notice
to the defendant if on bail. The examinations shall be conducted in the same 13
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witness from being restricted or imprisoned for an unreasonable length of time,
where he is unable to obtain or furnish sufficient security. At the same time the
witness's testimony is preserved and assured the opportunity of introduction at the
trial. Although the above provisions are favorable to the witness, and in most cases
to the prosecution, objection would possibly be made by the defendant. Defendant
may argue that he has the right not only to be confronted by the witness, but
also to have the jury present when the witness testifies.38 Professor Wigmore re-
futes the argument that the witness's presence before a tribunal is constitutionally
indispensable. The right to confrontation developed to protect the defendant's
right to cross-examination, and when this right is preserved, there is nothing further
that the defendant can ask.39 Missouri seems to be generally in accord with the
previous statement of Professor Wigmore, although there has been some differ-
ences in the cases as to when the testimony taken at preliminary hearings may be
introduced at the trial4 0
manner as the examination of witnesses before a committing magistrate is required
by this Code to be conducted [that is the testimony to be put into writing, there
should be right to counsel, right for the defendant to be present and cross-examine
the witness]. At the completion of the examination the witness shall be discharged,
and his disposition may be admitted in evidence at the trial under the same con-
iitions and for the same purposes as the depositions mentioned in section 53 ["...
if for any reason the testimony of the witness cannot be obtained at the trial
and the court is satisfied that the inability to procure such testimony is not due
to the fault of the party offering it.' (3) If no conditional examination is had
within the above mentioned period of three days, the witness so detained shall
be forthwith discharged."
37. See note 12 supra.
38. This argument was recognized in the Constitutional Debates, Nov. 16,
1943, Feb. 14, 1944, in discussing Proposal 183 (now substantially Article I, section
18 (b) of the Missouri Constitution, 1945). Mr. Coe stated, at page 1180: "I
think it very important for us to preserve the right of every defendant, not only
to confront the witness himself, but to have that witness confront the jury that is
trying the case." It may be doubted if this was an accurate statement of the then
law of Missouri. See note 40, infra.
39. 5 WIGMORE § 1397 et. seq. (3rd ed. 1940), and cases cited.
40. Sate v. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402 (1857) (Testimony from a preliminary
hearing, where the witness had subsequently died, held admissible under Common
Law, the sole requirements being: (1) a showing that the witness was dead; (2)
the presence of the defendant at the time of the taking of the testimony; (3) op-
portunity by the defendant to cross-examine); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431 (1858)
(Held that although at common law testimony from a preliminary hearing was
admissible if the witness had died, it was not admissible if the witness was merely
without the jurisdiction. The court refused the admission of testimony taken from
a witness who had recognized to appear, but had disappeared and could not be
found); State v. Harp, 320 Mo. 1, 6 S.W. 2d 562 (1929) (The witness was with-
out the state, beyond the reach of process. In expressly overruling State v. Houser
supra, the court said: "To all intents and purposes his [witness's] presence at the
trial was as unattainable as if he were dead. The appellant was confronted with
the witness at the former trial and cross-examined him. The testimony was admit-
ted); State v. Bradford, 324 Mo. 695, 24 S.W. 2d 993 (1930) (Followed State v.
Harp, supra, but excluded the testimony on the grounds that: (1) at the pre-
liminary hearing the magistrate did not recognize the witness as he might have
done; (2) no showing that effort was made to procure the attendance of the
witness; (3) no explanation for witness's failure to attend other then the "bare
fact that he resided in Yarbo, Arkansas, almost a mile from the Missouri State
1953] COMMENTS
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II. WiTNEssES WiTotrr THE STATE
Missouri now has no effective means of obtaining a material witness from
without the state at any stage in the proceedings. 4' Whether the witness in the
first instance is without the state or whether he has forfeited his recognizance and
left the state, the prosecution is in a helpless position. The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, recognizing the need of some method
of compelling out-of-state witnesses to attend proceedings within another state,
adopted the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without
the State in Criminal Cases" in 1931.42 In 1936 the provisions of the act were
made applicable to grand jury proceedings, and in the title of the act "Criminal
Proceedings" was substituted for "Criminal Cases." Missouri, with its two largest
cities located on the east and west boundaries of the state, would be particularly
susceptible to witnesses leaving the state to avoid testifying. The Uniform Act has
been adopted in some form in forty-one states and Puerto Rico.43
In 1948 S.B. 43, 64th General Assembly, which was similar to the Uniform
Act, was passed by both houses but was vetoed by Governor Donnelly.44 In the
66th General Assembly, S.B. 186, which incorporates the Uniform Act, was
passed by the Senate, but died in the House.4"
Line;" (4) the testimony was unsigned and not certified by the justice of the
peace as required by statute); State v. Pierson, 337 Mo. 475, 485, 85 S.W. 2d 48,
53 (1935) ("From an early day, we have held that the constitutional right to
confrontation is not denied where a witness is dead at the time of trial and the
testimony of such witness, given and duly preserved at a former hearing in the
same case, at which the defendant was present and was accorded the right to
cross-examine, is read to the jury.").
41. State v. Pagels, 82 Mo. 300, 4 S.W. 931 (1887) ("The right to compulsory
process for witnesses does not and cannot extend to non-resident witnesses.");
State ex. rel. Suter v. Wilder, 196 Mo. 418, 95 S.W. 396 (1906) (Court held that
subpoenas served without the state were without "force" or "vitality").
42. 9 U. L. A. 37. This act will hereinafter be referred to as the Uniform Act.
43. The following states, in addition to Missouri, remain without any pro-
vision for securing witnesses from without the state: Alabama, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, and Michigan.
44. Senate Journal, 64th Gen. Assembly, Vol. II, Jan. 7, 1948-Dec. 1, 1948
(Mo. 1947), pp. 2073-2077.
45. A comparison of S.B. 43 (64th General Assembly) and S.B. 186 (66th
General Assembly) shows the following differences: (1) S.B. 43 provided that a
material witness could be obtained from without a state only if he were a material
witness in a felony case. S.B. 186 and the Uniform Act, provides that a request
can be made for a person as a witness if "there is a criminal prosecution pending"
in a court of record, or in "a grand jury investigation [that] has commenced or is
about to commence." (2) S.B. 43 provided for the payment of five cents a mile to
the wituess, while S.B. 186 and the Uniform Act provides for the payment of ten
cents per mile. (3) S.B. 43 provided that where the judge of the requesting state
recommended that the witness be taken into immediate custody, "such witness
shall be entitled, . . . to offer to enter into a recognizance sufficient in amount and
as to sureties conditioned that the witness will appear at the time and place de-
signated ... and if, in the opinion and discretion of the [judge where witness is],
the recognizance so offered be adequate and sufficient, . . . he [judge] may ap-
prove and take such recognizance . . ." S.B. 186 and the Uniform Act have no
provision for a recognizance. (4) S.B. 43 outlined in more detail how the witness
was to be paid, and specifically stated that if the witness was summoned on behalf
[Vol. 18
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S.B. 186 provides: (1) that a judge of a court of record of a state which
has reciprocal legislation, may certify that a certain person within Missouri is a
material witness in a criminal prosecution or grand jury proceeding, and upon
presentation of such certificate to "any judge of a court of record in the county
in which such person is, "the court shall fix a time for a hearing, and shall order
the person to appear." (2) If at the hearing the court determines that the witness
is "material and necessary," that there would be no undue hardship upon the
witness, and that all states through which the witness must pass would give him
protection from arrest and from service of civil and criminal process, then upon
being tendered the sum of ten cents per mile and five dollars per day, the witness
shall be directed to attend the proceeding without the state. (3) Upon request of
the judge of the foreign state that the witness be taken into "immediate custody,"
notification of a hearing may be waived, and the judge in Missouri may direct
that the witness be brought immediately before the court for a hearing; upon
satisfaction "of the desirability" of such immediate custody, the Missouri judge may
order the witness to be delivered "to the officer of the requesting state." The tender
of ten cents per mile and five dollars per day applies in this provision also. (4)
Upon refusal "to attend and testify as directed in the summons," the witness may
be treated as any person who "disobeys a summons" of the court of the State of
Missouri. (5) Judges of courts of records of Missouri desiring a person from
without the state as a material witness, may use the procedure outlined above to
secure such witness, providing the witness is within a state which has similar
legislation. (6) If a witness enters this state but refuses "to attend and testify as
directed in the summons," he may be treated as any witness who "disobeys a
summons issued from a court of record in this state."
An act similar to S.B. 186 would insure Missouri the means of obtaining key
out-of-state witnesses who might be necessary for the successful prosecution of a
defendant.40 Although some restraint on the liberty of those persons who are forced
to comply with the statute is self evident, the act seems to be grounded on the
theory that it is the duty of every man to give testimony, and that state boundaries
should be no bar to such a duty. However some question has arisen as to the
validity of the act on constitutional grounds, and Governor Donnelly's veto message
strongly questioned the constitutionality of S.B. 43. Specifically, Governor Donnelly
objected on the basis: (1) that orders and judgments of a foreign court have no
validity in a sister state; (2) that there is a denial of due process of law when
no provision is made for notification of a hearing in case the immediate custody of
the witness is desired, especially since the act made express provision for notifica-
tion of a hearing, and for assurance of freedom from arrest and civil process when
of the defendant, the defendant was to tender the proper amount, but if the de-
fendant was acquitted, he was to be reimbursed.
46. In Annex I, Questionnaire, To the Report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee, The Missouri Senate, question 23 (c), the following question was posed:
"Extradition of witnesses in criminal cases?" The tabulated answers are: Judges:
15 for, 1 against; Bar Associations and Schools: 3 for, 7 against; Prosecuting
Attorneys: 31 for, 5 against. See note 26 supra. 16
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in the foreign state, in situations where the immediate custody of the witness is
not requested.47
Not many courts have passed on the validity of the act. In re Cooper48 and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kaluss4" are two cases upholding the validity,
while People of New York v. Parker,io In re People of New York,5' and Matter
of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania52 are cases denying the constitutionality of the
act. However, People of N.Y. v. Parker, supra, was decided on the narrow issue
of the title being defective.
The leading case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klauss, supra, which
upheld the validity of a New York Act upon which the Uniform Act was based,
expressly overruled Matter of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, sitpra, and clearly
discussed the pertinent constitutional issues involved. Regarding the contention
that the act did not afford the witness due process, the court in Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. Kaluss supra, stated at page 716:
"... the proposed witness is afforded more protection in the way of
due process than is a witness summoned to testify within the state for
he must be given notice, and an opportunity to be heard before a subpoena
can be issued, and in addition is assured of ample indemnity for expenses,
and immunity from the service of process while in the foreign state. This
would seem to be due process of law in every real sense."
The dissenting opinion contended there was an attempt at due process in form
only. In the Klauss case, however, the "immediate custody provision" of the
Uniform Act was not involved. It may be seriously questioned whether the
taking of a resident witness into immediate custody, without notice, upon the
request of a foreign jurisdiction, is reasonable within the meaning of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, there is still the requirement for a hearing, and the Missouri judge must
be satisfied as "to the desirability of such custody and delivery." Furthermore,
although the same safeguards are not expressly provided for as when there is a
"normal" request (such as there should be no hardship on the witness, and he shall
have immunity from process within the state he is to attend), perhaps it may
be presumed that the judge will condition the immediate turning over of the
witness to the requesting state upon the same circumstances as when witness is
not to be immediately turned over to such state. If this be true then it would
seem that there would be sufficient safeguards to comply with due process.8 3
47. See note 44 supra.
48. 127 N. J. 312, 22 A. 2d 532 (1941).
49. 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N.Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't. 1911).
50. 16 N. J. Misc. 411, 1 A. 2d 54 (1936).
51. 103 Leg. Intell. 1055 (Ct. of Quarter Sessions, County of Phila. Pa. 1940).
52. 45 Misc. Rep. 46, 90 N.Y. Supp. 808 (1904).
53. Governor Donnelly objected vigorously in his veto message to the "im-
mediate custody" provision, stating at page 2070-2076 of the Senate Journal, note
44, supra: "... . provision is neither made for notice of hearing nor for issuance of
summons.... The witness is thereby denied the right of notice of a hearing which
may result in the removal from the state of a citizen to undergo the hazards of
any eventuality that might transpire in his sojourn in the foreign state."
[Vol. 18
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However, to avoid any doubt on this point, the legislature should spell out the
details, and make it clear that the same safeguards, except notice, are to be
applicable in the "immediate custody" cases as in those cases where simply a
request is made for a witness. The concept of "notice" is incompatible with "im-
mediate custody." It is pertinent to point out that no similar provision was found
for procuring the "immediate" attendance of witnesses at local proceedings as
discussed above.
Regarding the objection that there is an abridgement of the privileges and
immunities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the court in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klauss, supra, dis-
posed of this contention by pointing out that the privileges and immunities
clause only prohibits a state from discriminating between a person who is not a citi-
zen within a state, and a person who is a citizen of the state. The provisions of the
Uniform Act apply to all persons whether citizens or not, with the only requisites
being that the person be within the state and that he be desired by a reciprocating
state in a criminal proceeding as a material witness.
It may be argued that reciprocal legislation as provided by the Uniform Act
is in effect an "agreement or compact with another State," in violation of Article I,
section 10 of the United States Constitution.- 4 However, in 1934 a federal statute
was enacted55 which gave states permission to enter into agreements "for cooper-
ative effort and material assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforce-
ment of their respective criminal laws and policies . . ." Hence even if the Uniform
Act were to be considered a compact or agreement, it, nevertheless, would seem
to be valid under the federal statute.
It was the opinion of at least one writer-G that the most difficult aspect of
the act was that State 1 is compelling a witness of State 1 to do an act in State 2.
However, the same writer went on to say 57 that there is a "tendency to adopt the
view that when a court obtains valid jurisdiction over any person, that jurisdiction
exists for all purposes and includes the power to order an act done beyond the
state's borders." This theory has the support of other writers on the subject. 5s
Thus, although there may be some doubt as to the validity of the act, care-
ful analysis shows that most of the questions may be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the Uniform Act. Therefore, perhaps the more desirable and
54. This section provides in part: "No state shall enter into any treaty,
alliance or confederation; . . . No state shall, without the consent of Congress
entering into any agreement or compact with another state,...
55. 48 STAT. 909, c. 406, § 1, 4 U.S.C.A. 111 (1934) provides: "The consent
of Congress is given to any two or more States to enter into agreement or compacts
for cooperative effort and material assistance in the prevention of crime and in
the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such
agencies, just or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such
agreements and compacts."
56. Legis., 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 717 (1937).
57. Id. at page 722.
58. WALSH, EQurry § 18, pp. 79-80 (1930); Notes, 10 GEo. WASH. L. RFv.
345 (1941), 19 N. C. L. REv. 391 (1941). See Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (9th
Cir. 1909).
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sensible thing to do would be to enact legislation similar to S.B. 186, and wait
for the supreme court to decide some of the tenuous questions regarding the
validity of the act, especially since forty-two jurisdictions have now enacted this
measure, apparently believing that it is constitutional."
III. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the provisions available in Missouri and a comparison with
the procedure available in some other jurisdictions has shown that there is a
need for the strengthening of the material witness law in Missouri. Undoubtedly,
the most important need is a law which will enable Missouri to obtain out-of-
state witnesses. The statutes and rules seem to adequately insure, by the use
of bail bonds, the attendance of the witness once he has appeared, although there
is perhaps a need for the combining and the weeding out of some sections to get
a more logical and understandable procedure. In addition there should be an
integration of the present statutes with the new rules to avoid confusion which
is now likely to result. There should be some protection offered to the witness,
however, who is unable to obtain bond.80 This should be in the form of allowing
the taking of a deposition which should be admissible at the trial, but only when
it appears that the witness is bona fide unavailable. It is possible that the rules
adequately cover this phase of the problem. The subpoena power should be used,
and if the witness leaves the state, use of the Uniform Act should first be made
59. For good general discussions on the problems involved in the Uniform
Act and similar legislation see the following: Notes 10 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 345
(1941), 43 HARV. L REv. 121 (1929), 41 MICH. L. REv. 171 (1941), N. C. L.
Rev. 391 (1941) Legis., 85 U. OF PA. L REv. 717 (1937).
60. N. Y. CODE CRTM. PRocED. § 618-b provides: "Whenever a judge of a
court of record in this State is satisfied, by proof on oath, that a person residing
or being in this state is a necessary and material witness for the people in a
criminal action or proceeding pending in any of the courts of this state, he may
order such person to enter into a written undertaking. . . " People v. Doe, 261
App. Div. 501, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 458 (1st Dep't 1941) ("The requisite facts [as stated
in the above section] must be present before an individual may be held in bond.
. .. In the absence of such, the fixing of bail or the alternative imprisonment are
without warrant in law."). People ex. rel. Ditchick v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171
Misc. 248, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 341 (1939), aff'd. 256 App. Div. 1081, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 232
(2nd Dep't. 1939). (Witness under § 618-b held on $50,000 bail. Held: Bail not
excessive. At p. 252: "The bail herein must be substantial to avoid the farce of
having some interested individuals supply the funds and to effect the relator's
release knowing that the money would be forfeited, but hoping in return for the
investment, the prosecution would be hampered, if not defeated, by his absence
from the trial." The sufficient safeguards for the witness are: (1) a hearing;
(2) satisfaction on part of the court by proof on oath that the witness possessed
information and that he would not appear;(3) Writ of habeas corpus.) Ex parte
Prall, 208 P. 2d 960 (Okla. 1949) (Under Oklahoma statutes, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 270-275 (1937), a material witness may be compelled to enter into a recog-
nizance for a reasonable amount for his appearance at the trial. The witness was
a transient, unemployed, hitchhiker and no permanent address. Bail of $3,000
was fixed in connection with the crime of sodomy. The court said at page 960:
"Under such circumstances, this court felt that the undertaking to require the
attendance of a witness at the preliminary examination should be large enough
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before the testimony contained in the deposition should be allowed. Finally the
rigid provision of allowing only a one hundred dollar recognizance where a writ
of attachment has been issued within the terms of Section 491.170 should be
changed to allow the magistrate or sheriff more discretion in setting the sum.
It should be remembered that "a witness is often an unfortunate person.
He has to make a troublesome journey, is kept wasting his time in unpleasant
places, can be cross-examined to tears,"16 and is often paid a small sum for
expenses. Therefore, in the administration of the witness laws, care should be
taken not to abuse the witness. Some of the considerations in fixing the amount
of bail of a material witness, which perhaps can be applied generally, were ex-
pressed as follows in the recent case of People ex. rel. Richards v. Warden of
City Prison:02
".. . the seriousness of the crime under investigation, the character of
the relator (witness), his relationship to those against whom he may be
called to testify, the possibility of flight to avoid giving testimony, and
the difficulty in procuring relator's return to the state if he should leave
the state. .. ."
With the strengthening of the laws along the lines suggested, together with a
careful administration of those laws, it is submitted that there will be a more
effective administration of criminal justice for all concerned.
BERNARD SILVERMAN
THE RYLANDS v. FLETCHER DOCTRINE AND
ITS STANDING IN MISSOURI
The decision in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher1 and the doctrine it
set forth has probably received as much discussion as any other English rule of
law. It seems proper, therefore, first to set forth exactly what was announced in
that case.
Rylands v. Fletcher involved a defendant mill-owner who employed competent
engineers and contractors to build a large water reservoir upon lands which he
held under a lease. The reservoir was constructed directly over an abandoned mine
shaft, which, when the reservoir became filled with water, collapsed and caused
the water to flow into connecting mines, located beneath the adjoining property,
of which the plaintiff was the lessee. In holding the defendant liable for the
damage, in the Exchequer Chamber,2 Mr. Justice Blackburn wrote this rule:
"The person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape."
61. Compelling the Attendance of Witnesses, 98 JusT. P. 299, 300 (1934).
62. 98 N.Y.S. 2d 173, 277 App. Div. 87 (1st Dep't 1950).
1. L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1886), affd. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & I. App. 1868).
2. L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1865).
1953] COMMENTS
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1953], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Lord Cairns, writing the affirming decision in the House of Lords,3 qualified the
above rule to some extent. He dealt with the question as to what extent prima facie
actionable things done may be justified because done by the defendant in the
course of putting his land to "natural" use, as constrasted with what he called
"non-natural" use. Thus the opinion of Lord Cairns seems to deal with the ques-
tion of social and economic expedience, whereas Mr. Justice Blackburn dealt purely
with a question of law.
These judges used as authority for their decisions the analogy to earlier cases
concerning animals and noxious odors. In their use of this analogy, a new concep-
tion of liability without fault came into being.
Almost immediately limitations to the doctrine arose, and it was held that
liability without fault would not be imposed where the escape was due to an act
of God, 4 or vis inajor.5 Later it was decided that, if the substance was brought
on the premises for the "common benefit" of the parties concerned;0 for the use of
the plaintiff;7 or required by law or incidents of tenure,8 the doctrine would not
apply to hold the defendant liable.
Also it should be observed that in England today the doctrine is no longer
limited to the escape of substances brought on the land by the defendant, nor to
cases that involve adjacent landowners. It has been extended to situations where
the plaintiff holds a license in the site of injury, such as a water main or electric
cables.0
The present day conception of the rule in England is perhaps best stated as
an "excessive use of some private right (whereby) a person has exposed his neigh-
bor's property or person to danger."10 Professor Bohlen observes" that the rule
as it is now stated "does not impose exceptional obligations upon owners of real
property, but is itself an instance of the general principle that every excessive use
of a private right which in its nature threatens harm to others, who are themselves
in the enjoyment of their own independent rights, is a nuisance or cognate thereto."
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States had at least two analogies
upon which to base the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. In the "blasting cases"
the courts generally held that if a substance was cast upon plaintiff's land as a
direct result of the defendant's intentional acts, then the defendant was liable
in trespass, regardless of the degree of care used by him.1 2 The nuisance cases
3. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & I. App. 1868).
4. Nichols v. Marsland, L.R. 10 Exch. 255 (1875), where an unprecedented
flood caused defendant's ornamental ponds to overflow.
5. Lambert v. Corporation of Lawestoft, 1 K.B. 590 (1901), where gnaw-
ing rats broke defendant's tanks.
6. Anderson v. Oppenheimer, L.R. 5 Q.B.D. 602 (1880).
7. Blake v. Woolf, 2 Q.B. 426 (1898).
8. Box v. Jubb, L.R. 4 Exch. 76 (1879).
9. Charing-Cross, West-End & City Elec. Supply Co. v. London Hydraulic
Power Co., 3 K.B. 442 (1913).
10. Wing v. London General Omnibus Co., 2 K.B. 652, 655 (1909).
11. BOHLEN, ToRTs 344, 414 (1926).
12. Scott v. Buy, 3 Md. 431 (1853); Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849).
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were treated in much the same manner, and the defendant was held liable
irrespective of the lack of negligence on his part.' 3 In spite of these analogies, the
Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine at first met with vigorous opposition in the United
States. The case was rejected almost immediately in New Hampshire, New York
and New Jersey.14 These cases repudiated the doctrine, either expressly or by
implication, mainly on the grounds that it would impose a liability upon growing
industry which would tend to impede its progress. Dangerous enterprises, involving
a high degree of risk to others, were clearly indispensable to the industrial and
commercial development of a new country, and it was considered that the interests
of those in the vicinity of such enterprises must give way to them, and that too
great a burden must not be placed upon them.
For these reasons the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was rejected, at least in
name, in the majority of American jurisdictions.'- However, it should be noted,
that many of the courts which have rejected the doctrine by name repeatedly have
imposed strict liability for nuisances, which were called "nuisances" only because
the activity was a highly dangerous one.' 6 Under this disguise Rylands v. Fletcher
has received more recognition than has generally been admitted or realized by
the courts.
It seems that in recent years there has been a tendency to recognize and
accept the doctrine. This is evidenced by the Restatement of Torts approving
the doctrine in the altered form of providing absolute liability for damage
caused by ultrahazardous activities. 7 It would seem that opposition to the doctrine
is now based to a great extent on adherence to the earlier cases. The reasons for
disapproval of absolute liability set forth in the earlier cases, i.e., the fear of
retarding industrial development, have to a great extent been eliminated. Our
society has now reached a more mature stage in technical development and it
seems the desirability of protecting the adjoining owner now outweighs the fear
of retardation of growth and development. In order to obtain order and symmetry
in the law, it would seem satisfactory to recognize the ultra-hazardous doctrine
set out in the Restatement of Torts.'8 With the use of this doctrine the courts could
13. Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468 (1890); Pottstown Gas Co. v.
Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1886).
14. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873); Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L.
339 (1876); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 (1873).
15. PROSSER, TORTS 452 (1941).
16. Birchard v. Board of Health of City of Lansing, 204 Mich. 284, 169
N. W. 901 (1918); Longten v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 Pac. 699 (1904); Heeg v.
Licht 80 N.Y. 579 (1880); Grossett v. Southern R. R., 115 Tenn. 376, 89 S.W.
737 (1905); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Tenative Draft No. 112, p. 150.
17. Section 519. "One who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm."
Section 520. "An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a
risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
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then cease to use the common law actions of trespass and nuisance in situations
which do not always include their traditional elements.
MIssouRI CASES
A. Liability when Damage is Caused by Concussion or by
Rocks Being Blown Onto Plaintiff's Property
Missouri decisions have generally held in the blasting cases that a defendant
is liable, irrespective of negligence.19 The paramount principle involved is that
one may not so use his own property as to injure the property of another. Even
though the defendant exercised the utmost care, it was he, nevertheless, who set
in motion the agency which caused the damage and he, not the plaintiff, who did
nothing, should be liable therefor.
In arriving at liability irrespective of negligence, the decisions use various
terms in explaining their outcome. The most common explanation is the common
law doctrine of nuisance.2o Other times the courts feel the situation fits the com-
mon law action of trespass.21 Then there are a few cases that do base the liability
on neither nuisance nor trespass, but rather talk in terms much like those used in
Rylands v. Fletcher.22 However, the courts never in express terms follow that case.
This last view is clearly stated in Schaefer v. Frazier-Davis Constr. Co., supra,
where, in indicating liability of the defendant, the court said: "Blasting is not
under all circumstances to be regarded as a nuisance per se. This was a lawful
work which one may lawfully do providing he avoids injuring persons or property
and defendant must pay damages for all these injuries regardless of the degree of
care exercised by him."
Chronological development has been from the use of nuisance and trespass
to the more recent view that there is liability irrespective of negligence in such
cases. This is not based on any particular common law action but simply is
justified because of the extremely hazardous nature of the activity.
Since the courts so loosely interchange the terms trespass, nuisance, and
extremely hazardous2s in these cases, there is generally no differentiation between
damages caused by concussion from the blasting and the damage caused by rocks
thrown upon the land by the blast.24 In both instances there is liability irrespec-
19. Stocker v. Richmond Heights, 235 Mo. App. 277, 132 S.W. 2d 1116(1939); Schaefer v. Frazier-Davis Constr. Co., 125 S.W. 2d 897 (Mo. App. 1939);
Gilbert v. Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co., 214 Mo. App. 207, 260 S.W. 790(1924); Holman v. Clark, 272 Mo. 266, 198 S.W. 868 (1917); Johnson v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry., 182 Mo. App. 349, 170 S.W. 456 (1914); Faust v. Pope, 132
Mo. App. 287, 111 S.W. 878 (1908); Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr. Co., 108
Mo. App. 112, 82 S.W. 1094 (1904); Blackford v. Herman Constr. Co., 132 Mo.
App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (1908).
1 20. Blackford v. Herman Constr. Co. and Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr.
Co., supra, note 19.
21. Faust v. Pope and Johnson v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., supra, note 19.
22. Gilbert v. Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co., Schaefer v. Frazier-Davis
Constr. Co. and Stocker v. Richmond Heights, supra, note 19.
23. Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr. Co., supra, note 19.
24. Blackford v. Herman Constr. Co. and Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr.
Co., supra, note 19.
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tive of negligence. In the first instance, because of the inherent right of the neigh-
boring landowner, and in the second the presence of a physical trespass that is
immediate and direct, and the issue of negligence being foreign in an action of
trespass.
B. Liability for Injury to Persons by Blasting
Besides the liability without fault discussed above as to property damage in
the case of blasting, it is the general view in Missouri that where one discharges
blasts on his own land and thereby throws rock, earth, or debris on the premises
of his neighbor then the liability also extends to personal injuries sustained by
such adjoining landowner, or anyone lawfully upon his premises.25 The rule extends
also to injuries suffered by persons lawfully traveling upon a public highway.26
Again the courts vary with the circumstances as to applying nuisance or
trespass and also at times the decisions take a view much like that set forth in
the Restatement of Torts27-applying absolute liability because of the hazardous
nature of the activity. Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co.28 clearly illustrates this
view: "It seems to be well established that the use of high explosives in blasting,
especially in a populous neighborhood or near a public highway, is so fraught with
danger that the person using same for that purpose is held liable for injury done
thereby to either the person or property of another, without proof of negligence."
This again indicates a trend of applying an ultrahazardous doctrine rather than
using trespass or nuisance.
C. Absolute Liability for Damage or Injury From
Explosion of Stored Explosives
This classification deals generally with storing of such explosives as powder,
dynamite, and nitroglycerin and not with storage of such substances as gasoline,
oils or gas, which are usually regarded as combustibles rather than explosives. In
Missouri it has been held that the storage of explosives in large quantities and in
proximity to houses, and in buildings in general, so that injury to either persons
or property is likely to result, renders the person storing them absolutely liable
for all damages caused by any such explosion, and negligence is not a relevant
issue.29 The grounds for this liability are usually that the act of storing constituted
a public or private nuisance. These nuisances, however, are based on such grounds
as: extremely hazardous circumstances; 0 storing unnatural substances on the
25. Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153 S.W. 2d 547 (Mo. App. 1941);
Baker v. Gates, 279 Mo. 630, 216 S.W. 775 (1919); Hoffman v. Walsh, 117 Mo.
App. 278, 93 S.W. 853 (1906); Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55, 21 S.W. 451 (1893).
26. Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co., 189 Mo. App. 126, 174 S.W. 447 (1915).
27. Sections S19-520.
28. Supra, note 26.
29. Liggett v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 274 Mo. 115, 202 S.W. 372 (1918);
French v. Center Creek Powder Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S.W. 723 (1913);
Schnitzer v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 160 S.W. 282 (Mo. 1912); Scalpino v. Smith,
154 Mo. App. 524, 135 S.W. 1000 (1911).
30. French v. Center Creek Powder Mfg. Co., supra, note 29.
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land; 31 and due to the activity's ultra-hazardous character.3 2 This again indicates
the use of an absolute liability doctrine under the name of common law nuisance.
This illustrates the courts' desire to apply such a doctrine and it also illustrates
the reluctance to set up such a doctrine as a separate rule apart from and in
addition to the common law actions of nuisance and trespass.
D. Liability Imposed on Defendant for Having Combustibles on
His Land That Cause Damage to the Plaintiff
It seems that in Missouri generally a defendant is only held on a negligence
theory for having combustibles on his land that cause harm to plaintiff on his
land.33 This does not seem too logical when one views the decision above on
explosives, but nevertheless the courts seem to find some significant distinction
between the two. It would appear that many combustibles are just as dangerous
as dynamite and nitroglycerine and are of an equally explosive nature. There are
some decisions that have recognized this fact,3 ' and the courts have many times
gotten around the general requirement of negligence by calling the situation a
nuisance.3 5 These. decisions seem to use nuisance in the traditional sense and
to find this nuisance the courts demand that there be a continuous and habitual
handling of the combustibles in a negligent manner. When this nuisance is
established then it does away with the requirement of negligence as to the
immediate situation that resulted in injury to a plaintiff. This thought was
clearly set out in Green v. Spinning, 16 in which the court said: "A distinction
has been made between acts lawful in themselves, done by one upon his premises,
which may result in injury to another if not properly done or guarded, and those
which in the nature of things must so result in injury; in the first case the person
could be liable for actual negligence, while in the latter he would be liable for
all consequences of his acts, whether guilty of negligence or not. The one can
only become a nuisance by reason of the negligent manner in which it is performed,
while the other is a nuisance per se."
The first situation mentioned is that given to combustibles, whereas the
second is that generally given to explosives that are used in populated areas.
This distinction must be kept in mind as the cases are viewed, for at times the
court will call the keeping of combustibles a nuisance, and the explanation for
this is the continuous negligent manner in which they have been handled. Missouri
courts have generally repudiated Rylands v. Fletcher and refused to follow it in
31. Scalpino v. Smith, supra, note 29.
32. Schnitzer v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Corp., supra, note 29.
33. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W. 2d 518 (1931);
Green v. Spinning, 48 S.W. 2d 51 (Mo. App. 1932); Combs v. Standard Oil of
Indiana, 296 S.W. 817 (Mo. App. 1927); St. Marys Mill Co. v. Illinois Oil Co.,
254 S.W. 735 (Mo. App. 1923).
34. Buchholz v. Standard Oil, 211 Mo. App. 397, 244 S.W. 973 (1922).
35. Buchholz v. Standard Oil, supra note 34; St. Marys Mill Co. v. Illinois
Oil Co. and Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line, supra, note 33.
36. Supra, note 33.
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this situation,37 but they arrive at the same result when traditional nuisance
will apply.
There is another line of cases which may appropriately be included under
this section, although they should be segregated from the above line of cases.
These are the gas pipe line cases that generally concern municipal utilities. These
cases can be considered as analagous to the Rylands situation if the easement
where the pipes are laid can be considered the gas company's land. The analogy
seems close enough to justify pointing out the thought followed in these cases.
Almost every such case in Missouri follows a strict negligence theoryS and does
not bring in nuisance even when the negligent operation is continuous and
abiding. This result may be justifiable, however, when one considers the possible
results to a utility company if they were held absolutely liable for all their
pipe lines.
E. Liability When a Dam Backs Water Off of Dam Owner's Land
Onto Another's Land
As a general statement it may be said that the Missouri courts have not
accepted or applied the Rylands v. Fletcher theory in this situation of water
backed onto another's land, but it should be added that they arrive at the same
result by applying the action of nuisance09 or trespass. 40 Thus the courts again
fall back on the common law actions to accomplish the same result that would
be obtained by calling the backed up water an unnatural gathering that has
escaped to plaintiff's land. It is not surprising that this is the result arrived at
because of the reluctance in accepting outright the Rylands v. Fletcher theory and
in this case such a theory is not at all necessary to obtain liability without
negligence. The physical encroachment of water upon another's land can easily
be fitted into the action of trespass or nuisance. The development in the cases
mentioned shows a tendency to use trespass more frequently than nuisance as
grounds for this liability and this would seem to be the most desirable and
logical way of handling this particular situation since it does have the elements
of a common law trespass.
F. Liability of Owners of Dams When Damage Is Caused by the Dam
Bursting; by Overflow or Seepage of Water, Including Seepage
From Reservoirs
As to the problem of damage caused by the bursting of a dam, there seems
to be very little litigation. Evidently this is because the factual situation seldom
37. Greene v. Spinning, supra, note 33.
38. Gas Service Co. v. London & Lancashire Inc., 188 F. 2d 404 (8th Cir.
1951); Golden v. National Utilities Co., 356 Mo. 84, 201 S.W. 2d 292 (1947).
39. Webb v. Union Electric Co., 223 S.W. 2d 13 (Mo. App. 1949); Payne v.
Kansas City, St. J. & C.B. R.R., 20 S.W. 322 (Mo. 1892).
40. Kennedy v. Union Electric, 221 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. App. 1949), discussed
in 15 Mo. L. REv. 166 (1950); Grace v. Union Electric Co., 239 Mo. App. 1210,
200 S.W. 2d 364 (1947); Reed v. Cullor, 32 S.W. 2d 296 (Mo. App. 1930);
Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage Dist., 226 S.W. 277 (Mo. App. 1921); McGhay
v. Woolston, 162 S.W. 292 (Mo. App. 1914); Brill v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 144
S.W. 174 (Mo. App. 1912).
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arises. Missouri, however, has taken a clear stand on this problem in the case of
MUrphy v. Gillumn41 and this case has stood as authority on this question. In
this case there was an action for damages to plaintiff's land caused by water escap-
ing from defendant's pond. The defendant was held liable only if there was negligence
shown in the building of the embankment forming the pond. The decision went
further than this, however, and stated that a defendant would not be liable for
the bursting of his dam, unless the bursting was caused by defendant's negligence.
This case specifically repudiated the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher in this situ-
ation and declared firmly that negligence must be shown.
As the above case sets up the negligence requirement for bursting dams, also
it sets up the requirement of negligence for liability as to seepage of water. This
has been followed generally in water seepage cases including water pipes,42 re-
servoirs and ponds,43 and basement excavations. 44 The water pipe cases take the
general view that water in pipes is not an unnatural gathering of a dangerous
agent and thus distinguish them from the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, leaving no
necessity of stating definitely whether the doctrine would or would not be fol-
lowed. The pond and reservoir cases, however, generally point out that Rylands
v. Fletcher will not be followed, and there must be a showing of negligence in
the building or maintenance of the pond or reservoir.
CONCLUSION
As has been emphasized in the discussion above, Missouri generally does
not follow the doctrine set forth in Rylands v. Fletcher. Many times this doctrine
is not necessary to apply liability without negligence for the factual situations
will often contain the elements of trespass or nuisance. There are other times,
however, when the courts have felt it desirable to apply strict liability, yet the
true elements of common law trespass or nuisance were not present. This is
when the word "trespass" or "nuisance" is used in a manner which is contrary
to normal historical usage. It would seem that if the courts feel that liability
without fault is the most desirable end in these cases then, for the sake of
symmetry, understandability and a fair application of strict liability, a rule such
as set forth in Rylands v. Fletcher and reiterated in the Restatement of Torts
should be recognized. This would prevent the undersirable overuse of trespass
and nuisance and at the same time would provide a clear cut rule as to what
actions would make a person liable without a showing of negligence. This is
assuming, of course, a highly controversial question-is absolute liability now
desirable in such cases?
WILLIAM E. GLADDEN
41. 73 Mo. App. 487 (1898).
42. DeMayo v. Kansas City, 210 S.W. 380 (Mo. 1919); Stifel v. City of
St. Louis, 181 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1915); McCord Rubber Co. v. St. Joseph Water Co.,
181 Mo. 678, 81 S.W. 189, 7 Mo. BUL. L. SEa. (1904); Dammann v. City of St.
Louis, 152 Mo. 186, 53 S.W. 932 (1899); Schindler v. Standard Oil, 207 Mo. App.
190, 232 S.W. 735 (1921).
43. Farrar v. Shuss, 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S.W. 512 (1926); Chapman v.
American Creosoting Co., 220 Mo. App. 419, 286 S.W. 837 (1926).
44. Martin v. Benoist, 20 Mo. App. 262 (1886). 27
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